

Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

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----- 044116

R 191505Z DEC 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4788
USMISSION GENEVA
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 CAIRO 4133

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GENEVA FOR THE SECRETARY'S PARTY

EO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR EG SA
SUBJECT: KAMAL ADHAM'S VIEWS

1. SAUDI ROYAL COUNSELOR KAMAL ADHAM, WHOM I HAD KNOWN IN SAUDI ARABIA, ARRIVED CAIRO MONDAY AFTERNOON. YES-TERDAY HE WENT WORD THROUGH SAUDI AMBASSADOR FUAD NAZIR THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A TALK WITH ME. I SPENT AN HOUR WITH HIM LAST EVENING WITH NAZIR ALSO PRESENT. KAMAL'S PURPOSE SEEMED TO BE TO PRESENT VARIOUS "KAMALISMS" WHICH HE WANTED TO BE SURE USG UNDERSTANDS. SPECIFICALLY:

2. EGYPTIAN-SAUDI RELATIONS: DESPITE PAST STRAINS, SAUDI-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS ARE NOW GOOD. FEISAL AND SADAT HAVE CLOSE PERSONAL RRELATIONSHIP. FEISAL, WHOM SADAT CONSULTS FREQUENTLY, HAS CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE ON THE PRESIDENT. SO MUCH SO, IN FACT, THAT VARIOUS "HIGH PEOPLE" (UNIDENTIFIED) AROUND SADAT, WHO BELIEVE THEIR VIEWS HAVE NOT BEEN GIVEN A FAIR HEARING BY THE PRESIDENT, APPEAL TO FEISAL TO INTERVENE WITH SADAT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR VIEWS. THOUGH SELECTIVE, FEISAL DOES SO WHEN HE THINKS IT DESIRABLE. SADAT, ACCORDING TO ADHAM, USUALLY DEFERS TO FEISAL'S WISHES.

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3. FEISAL'S POSITION: FEISAL IS CURRENTLY AT THE PEAK OF HIS INFLUENCE, BOTH AT HOME AND IN ARAB WORLD. HE IS CONSCIOUS OF THIS NEW STATURE AND WISHES DO NOTHING TO UNDERMINE IT. THOUGH HE FEELS THAT HIS COUNSEL

WAS FOR YEARS IGNORED BY USG AND ATTRIBUTES RECENT
DETERIORATION IN MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND US-ARAB RELA-
TIONS TO THIS, HE IS ANXIOUS RETAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH
THE UNITED STATES. HE HAS CONSTANTLY MADE THIS CLEAR
AND IS PREPARED DO SO AGAIN. HOWEVER, HE WILL NOT ACT
IN A MANNER WHICH COMPROMISES HIS CURRENT PRESTIGE.
IN
SOLICITING FEISAL'S ASSISTANCE, USG SHOULD BEAR THIS IN
MIND.

4. JERUSALEM: DESPITE OCCASIONAL PUBLIC STATEMENT
TO THE CONTRARY, FEISAL NO LONGER ADAMANT ON RETURN OF
WEST BANK TO JORDAN. ACCORDING ADHAM, HIS SOLE
CONCERN AT THE MOMENT IS THAT IN ANY FINAL SETTLEMENT
JERUSALEM NOT RPT NOT BE UNDER ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY.
THIS COULD EMBRACE SOME KIND OF
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF FORMERLY JORDANIAN-HELD JERU-
SALEM. SUCH INTERNATIONALIZATION NEED NOT INCLUDE NEW
JERUSALEM, SINCE DOING SO WOULD BRING IN LARGE NUMBER
OF ISRAELIS.

5. PALESTINIANS: THOUGH HUSSEIN UPSET AT RECENT AL-
GIERS SUMMIT RECOGNITION OF PALESTINIANS, WHICH FEISAL
ENDORSED, JORDANIAN KING HAS NO RIGHT TO BE SO. FEISAL
HAD URGEED HIM TO ATTEND ALGIERS CONFERENCE. IN COM-
MENTING ON CURRENT STRAINS, ADHAM RECALLED SAUDIS AND
HASHEMITES HAVE LONG HISTORY OF MUTUAL SUSPICION. HE
ARGUED THAT WHILE FEISAL HAS IN PAST FEW YEARS SOUGHT TO
IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH HUSSEIN AND TO ASSIST HIM
FINANCIALLY, FEISAL IS IN FACT "FLEXIBLE" ON JORDANIAN
QUESTION. PALESTINIANS SHOULD HAVE OPTION OF GOING
THEIR OWN WAY OR STAYING WITH HUSSEIN.

6. US-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS: FEISAL HAS BEEN HELPFUL
IN URGING SADAT(A) TO AVOID TYING HIMSELF COMPLETELY
TO THE SOVIETS, AND (B) TO IMPROVE HIS RELATIONS WITH
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USG. ADHAM ASSERTED SADAT WANTS BETTER RELATIONS WITH
USG, BUT BELIEVES SOME OF HIS ADVANCES HAD BEEN UN-
REQUITED. RECENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF AGREEMENT IN PRIN-
CIPLE TO RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AT AN EARLY DATE
AND MY ARRIVAL HERE WERE BOTH POSITIVE STEPS. ADHAM
HOPED USG WOULD CONTINUE TO SEIZE OPPORTUNITIES TO
STRENGTHEN SADAT AND SUPPORT HIM. SADAT IS A
"MODERATE," AND STRENGTHENED AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH HIM
WOULD BE BENEFICIAL NOT ONLY TO USG BUT ALSO TO ANTI-
SOVIET STATES IN MIDDLE EAST AREA.

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7. SYRIA: ONLY FOUR STATES IN MIDDLE EAST AREA THAT NOW COUNT ARE EGYPT, ALGERIA, SAUDI ARABIA AND SYRIA. ALGERIA COMING AROUND. SYRIA, HOWEVER, CONTINUES TO BE DIFFICULT. ITS UNWILLINGNESS ATTEND PEACE CONFERENCE WITHOUT PRIOR AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT IS LATEST EVIDENCE OF THIS. ISRAELI DEMAND FOR LIST OF POW'S CAPTURED BY SYRIANS AND IRC ACCESS TO THEM CERTAINLY REASONABLE. HE IMPLIED THAT HE KNEW SYRIAN RELUCTANCE TO COMPLY IS PROMPTED BY WHAT HE CALLED "EMBARRASSMENT" SHOULD ANY SUCH DISCLOSURE BE FORCED UPON THEM. INITIALLY THERE HAD BEEN ABOUT 60-70 ISRAELI POW'S CAPTURED BY SYRIANS. ASSAD GOVERNMENT HAD FOOLISHLY ALLOWED MANY TO BE ELIMINATED. NOW HE THOUGHT THERE WERE ONLY ABOUT 25 LEFT. SYRIANS DO NOT WANT TO GIVE LIST OR ALLOW IRC ACCESS BECAUSE THIS WOULD EXPOSE THE LARGE NUMBERS THEY HAVE DONE AWAY WITH. MOREOVER, SYRIANS ARE CONCERNED THAT IMMEDIATE DISCLOSURE OF POW NUMBERS WOULD SO INFURIATE ISRAELIS THAT ISRAELI-SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE. PERHAPS SOME WHAT HE CALLED "PROPORTIONAL" DISENGAGEMENT COULD BE WORKED OUT, I.E., IF ISRAELIS DISENGAGE CERTAIN KILOMETERAGE ON EGYPTIAN FRONT, A SIMILAR BUT PROPORTIONAL TOKEN WITHDRAWAL MIGHT TAKE PLACE ON SYRIAN FRONT. THIS WOULD AT LEAST SAVE FACE FOR ASSAD AND MAKE IT EASIER FOR EGYPTIANS TO GO AHEAD. INTERESTINGLY, BOTH ADHAM AND NAZIR EXPRESSED SYMPATHY
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FOR ISRAELI VIEW THAT PAST SYRIAN ACTION ON GOLAN HEIGHTS JUSTIFIED ISRAELI BELIEF SYRIANS SHOULD NOT RETURN TO ALL OF GOLAN HEIGHTS. IF SYRIANS GOT QUNEITRA BACK, HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD SUFFICE.

8. OIL EMBARGO: WHEN IMPOSING INITIAL EMBARGO, SAUDIS HAD BASED THEIR CALCULATION ON WRONG STATISTICS RE US

PETROLEUM REQUIREMENTS. HE CLAIMED THEY HAD NOT REALIZED HOW HEAVY THE BLOW WOULD BE. FEISAL ALLEGEDLY DESIRES FIND SOME WAY OF EASING IT, BUT HAVING PUBLICLY GONE ON RECORD, HE CAN ONLY DO SO IF (A) SADAT ASKS HIM TO DO SO, OR (B) HE HAS SOME TANGIBLE DISENGAGEMENT ON WHICH TO PEG AN EASING. ONCE THIS TAKES PLACE, SAUDIS WILL BE HELPFUL.

9. SAUDI ROYAL ADVISORS: IN A FASHION THAT I HAVE HEARD SO OFTEN FROM SENIOR SAUDI OFFICIALS, ADHAM EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT VARIOUS PEOPLE AROUND THE KING--MENTIONING SAQQAF, YAMANI AND OTHERS--CLAIM THEY CAN INFLUENCE FEISAL TO EASE EMBARGO. ADHAM SAID HE HOPED SECRETARY REALIZES THAT FEISAL ALONE WILL MAKE THIS DECISION IN THE LIGHT OF THE KING'S JUDGMENT OF THE SITUATION. USG SHOULD NOT BE MISLED BY SOME OF THESE CLAIMS. I TOLD ADHAM THAT I WAS SURE SECRETARY KNOWS THAT FEISAL, WHILE LISTENING TO THE VIEWS OF HIS ADVISORS, MAKES ULTIMATE DECISIONS HIMSELF ON BASIS OF HIS BEST JUDGMENT. I TWITTED ADHAM THAT I RECALLED SUCH SITUATIONS WHERE EVEN HIS "FINE COUNSEL" HAD BEEN THUS IGNORED. ADHAM LAUGHED AND AGREED.

10. COMMENT: ADHAM SEEMS TO HAVE EXCELLENT ENTREE TO SENIOR EGYPTIAN CIRCLES AND IS APPARENTLY USED AS AN UNOFFICIAL CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATIONS TO SADAT. HIS PRINCIPAL CONTACT SEEMS TO BE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR ASHRAF MARWAN. HIS RELATIONS WITH SAUDI AMBASSADOR NAZIR APPEAR TO BE GOOD. THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS LOCALLY THAT ADHAM IS ALSO INVOLVED IN VARIOUS LOCAL BUSINESS DEALS ALONG WITH SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE EGYPTIAN ESTABLISHMENT. KAMAL WAS EVASIVE ON HIS ITINERARY. HOWEVER, WE NOTE HIS PERSONAL SECRETARY CAME BY USINT YESTERDAY TO OBTAIN A VISITORS VISA TO THE US FOR HIMSELF.

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